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DOROTHY A. HOUSELY AND BONNIE J. BRINTON,
Cross-Complainants-Respondents,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation,
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK,
Cross-Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANTS BRIEF ON APPEAL
****

STATEMENT OF THE KIND Of CASE
This is an action by plaintiff real estate broker to
recover a real estate commission, and by cross-complainants
for specific performance of an earnest money agreement.

The

suit was against Heath Development Company, a corporation,
it having been stipulated prior to trial that the actions
against the individual defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a trial before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor sitting without a jury, the court found for the plaintiff and
for the cross-claimants and entered judgment for the real
estate commission and an order of specific performance of
the earnest money agreement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
•

'

•'

i

....

•

"•

1 . 1

i

Appellants seek to have the judgment of the District
Court reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Heath Development Company is a Utah Corporation, its only asset being the Pioneer Trailer Park located
at 937 South State in Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 447). It is
a close family corporation having a total of nine stockholders
at the time of these transactions.

Five of the nine stock-

holders serve on the Board of Directors^
In recent years the corporation h#s listed the Pioneer
Trailer Park for sale with various realtors for the sum of
$400,000.00 (T. 402). On a prior occasion an oral offer of
$325,000.00 had been made, but not accepted by the corporation.
(T. 403). On November 13, 1973 Dorothy A. Housely, a director
in the company, (T. 402) , and the manager of the Pioneer
Trailer Park, (T. 402) , signed a listing with the plaintiff
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real estate broker for the sales price of $400,000.00.

(T. 402).

Thereafter on November 19, 1973, six of the stockholders of
the company signed a document purporting to ratify the original
listing agreement signed by Dorothy A. Housely.

(T. 319).

Pursuant to the listing agreement, plaintiff attempted
to sell the Pioneer Trailer Park but was unsuccessful.

(T. 322).

Without any encouragement from plaintiff, and without any
solicitation or effort on plaintiff's part, Dorothy A. Housely,
the same person who signed the listing agreement, decided that
she would like to purchase the trailer park.

(T. 323). After

conferring with the plaintiff and with her sister and brotherin-law, Bonnie and Elmer Brinton (Bonnie also being a stockholder and director) an Earnest Money Offer was prepared on
January 12, 1974, wherein Dorothy and Bonnie offered to purchase
the trailer park for $250,000.00.

(T. 325).

On that date the plaintifffs agent, Mason Rankin, telephoned the President of the corporation, Kathryn D. Heath, to
arrange a directors' meeting for presentation of the offer.
(T. 326). The meeting was scheduled for the next afternoon
at the home of Kathryn D. Heath.

(T. 326). Those present

at the directors1 meeting on January 13, 1974, at which the
offer was presented, included:

Kathryn D. Heath, President,

Director and owner of 20% of the common stock; Essie Heath
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(since deceased), Secretary, Director and owner of 20% of
the common stock; Dorothy A. Housely, Director and owner of
approximately 20% of the common stock; Bonnie Brinton, Treasurer, Director and owner of approximately 20% of the common
stock; the plaintiff and plaintiff's agent, Mason Rankin
(T. 325-330).
Of the four directors present it was the first time
that any of them had actually received a written offer to purchase the sole asset of the corporation. (T. 426-7).

Mr.

Rankin went through the offer of purchase at least twice, and
insisted that the property was only worth $250,000.00 rather
than the $400,000.00 that it was listed at and that they would
not receive a better offer. (T. 448-450).

This meeting lasted

for about two hours. (T. 390). Essie Hfeath, the secretary of
the corporation, was so confused by the offer she couldn't
even write it in the minutes and asked cbne of the purchasers
to write the terms of the offer in the minute book which Mrs.
Housely did. (T. 414).
The plaintiff and his agent were aware that they were
dealing with a corporation and with the sale of corporate
property. (T. 348-349).

The plaintiff ind his agent were

both duly licensed and knowledgeable in the real estate business. (T. 385-386).

Neither plaintiff nor his agent gave

any instructions to the directors on how to sign the Earnest
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Money document. (T. 506). All signatures are in a personal
capacity and nothing on the document purports to bind the
corporation. (T. 471-472; and T. 519).
The Articles of Incorporation call for five directors
with the qualification that each hold one full share of
common stock. (Exhibit 5-P). The fifth director, Sandra
Flinders, held less than one full share of stock. (P. 352).
However, the other stockholders had continuously and unanimously elected her a director and authorized her to function
as vice president since 1964. (T. 487-488).

The Articles

of Incorporation provide that a majority of the directors
shall constitute a quorum and the act of the majority of the
quorum shall be the act of the corporation. (Exhibit 5-P).
The Earnest Money Agreement signed January 13, 1974,
was further conditioned upon the buyer's obtaining financing.
(Exhibit 3-P). The buyers did not qualify for financing on
their own. (T. 382-383).

On or about March 15, 1974, after

two months of trying to obtain financing, the plaintiff through
his agent Mason Rankin presented an offer to purchase the
trailer park to Dorothy A. Housely and Bonnie Brinton for
$400,000.00. (T. 375). Bonnie Brinton and Dorothy A. Housely
were directors of Heath Development Company at this time and
did not disclose this offer to anyone else in the corporation.
(T. 476). Hugh Wayman, the new purchaser, agreed to co-sign
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for Mrs. Housely*s and Mrs. Brintonfs financing on the original purchase agreement. (T. 382-383).

The lending institu-

tion agreed to make the loan with Hugh Wayman being responsible
for repayment (T. 382-383).
On April 9, 1974, Mason Rankin took a warranty deed to
the home of Kathryn

D. Heath for her signature. (T. 452).

The proposed deed was from the corporation to Dorothy Housely
and Bonnie and Elmer Brinton.

The deed did not contain the

name of Hugh Wayman nor did Mason Rankin tell Mrs. Heath
anything about Mr. Wayman. (Exhibit 7-P). Mrs. Heath refused
to sign the deed. (T. 454). On April 11, 1974, the plaintiff
presented another Earnest Money Agreement and Offer to Purchase
directly to the corporation from Hugh Wayman for $400,000.00.
(T. 521) . After counterproposals between Hugh Wayman and the
corporation, no agreement was reached.

Suit was filed by

plaintiff for a real estate commission on the Earnest Money
Agreement of January 13, 1974, and a cross-claim was filed
by Dorothy Housely and Bonnie Brinton for specific performance
under the $250,000.00 Earnest Money Agreement of January 13,
1974.
The court found that the listing agreement was valid
and that the plaintiff secured and presented an offer to purchase the Pioneer Trailer Park for $250,000.00 from a ready,
willing and able buyer and that the offer was accepted by
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the corporation, (R. 275-279).

Based on these findings,

the court entered judgment for plaintiff for the real estate
commission in the amount of $15,000.00 with interest at 6%
per annum from April 10, 1974, for a total to date of entry
of judgment, of $16,650.00. Also the court awarded attorney's
fees of $5,000.00 with interest at 6% per annum on the attorney's
fees from April 10, 1974, until the date of judgment. (R. 280281).

Further, the court ordered specific performance on the

cross-claim ordering the corporation to convey the property
to directors Dorothy Housely and Bonnie Brinton and awarded
attorney's fees of $7,500.00. (R. 294-297).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 13, 1973 WAS
NEVER SIGNED OR ACCEPTED BY A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED QUORUM
OF HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND THE CONTRACT CREATED IS
VOIDABLE.
The Articles of Incorporation of Heath Development
Company provide that "three members of the Board of Directors
shall constitute a quorum and shall be authorized to transact
business and exercise the corporate powers of the corporation".
Article X, Articles of Incorporation.

Section 16-10-34, Utah

Code Annotated 1953 provides that, "The act of a majority of
the directors present at a meeting at which a quorum is present
shall be the act of the Board of Directors".
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Applying this

statute in the Heath Development Company situation would
mean that if there is a quorum of three directors present,
that the vote of two of the directors could bind the corporation.
Of the five directors in Heath Development Company,
four attended the meeting at which the Earnest Money Agreement
was presented.

Two of the directors were purchasers on the

Earnest Money Agreement and thus were personally interested
in having the corporation agree to the offer or purchase,
leaving only two disinterested directors.

The question of

considering interested directors for purposes of quorum requirements is discussed in 2 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation,
Sec. 426 at P. 280 as follows:
"Although, there is at least some authority
which recognizes an interested director's
eligibility for quorum purposes, the majority
and better view is that a director who is
disqualified by reason of personal interest
in the matter before a directorsf meeting
loses, pro hac vice, his character as a
director, and he cannot be counted for the
purpose of making out a quorum."
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the majority view that
interested directors cannot be counted for quorum purposes
in the case of Rocket Mining Corporation vs. Rulan J. Gill,
25 Utah 2d 434, 483 P. 2d 897 (1971).

In this case the court

determined that there was a "properly constituted board of
four directors" and that only one of the directors had a
-8-

personal interest in the matter before the board.

The court

held that:
"In reference to the question as to whether
there was a proper quorum to transact business,
Sec. 16-10-38, UCA 1953 provides that such a
quorum shall consist of a majority of the
number of directors fixed by the Bylaws or
. . . stated in the Articles of Incorporation
. . . we accept the proposition advocated by
the plaintiffs that in matters where a director
has an interest adverse to the corporation he
cannot participate to bind the corporation."
The court concluded that because one of the directors received
a direct benefit he was disqualified from participating in the
action of the board and could not be counted for quorum purposes.
This rule was followed again by the Utah Supreme Court as
expressed in the dicta of Branch vs. Western Factors Inc., 28
Utah 2d 361, 502 P. 2d 570.

In Branch, the court referred to

an 1898 Utah case, Singer vs. Salt Lake Copper Manufacturing
Company, 17 Utah 143, 53 P. 1024, in which a director voted in
favor of a transaction between himself and the corporation.
The court stated that "there were present at the meeting four
of the five directors so there was a quorum excluding the interested director".
An example of application of the majority rule is the
Colorado case of Colorado Management Corporation vs. American
Founders Life Insurance Company, 359 P. 2d 665 (Colo. 1961).
In the Colorado case only six of eight board members of plaintiff
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were in attendance.

Of the six present, three were directors

of another corporation and considered to be interested in the
matter before the board.

The bylaws of the plaintiff cor-

poration provided that five directors would constitute a
quorum.

In determining that the three disinterested directors

did not constitute a quorum, the court held at page 667 as
follows:
"A director cannot with propriety vote in the
board of directors upon a matter affecting his
own private interest anymore than a judge can
sit in his own case; and any resolution passed
at a meeting of the directors which a director
having a personal interest in the matter voted
would be voidable at the instance of the corporation, without regard to its fairness, provided the vote of such director was necessary
to the result. It follows t^hat a director of
a corporation cannot be counted in determining
the existence of a quorum wl^en the transaction
under consideration is one i|n which the director
has a personal interest adverse to that of the
corporation." Citations omitted.
It would follow that in the case before the court that a proper
disinterested quorum of directors never considered the Earnest
Money Agreement and the action taken was not binding on the
corporation.

Of the four directors present at the meeting

where the offer was considered, two directors wanted to purchase
the sole asset of the corporation.

Their offer of purchase

was $150,000.00 below what these same two directors agreed to
list the property for, three months earlier.
created by their personal interest is obvious.
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The conflict

The following cases are representative of the majority
rule that interested directors are not to be considered for
quorum purposes:

Goldie vs. Cox, 130 F. 2d 695; Kerbs vs.

California Eastern Airways, Inc. (Del), 90 A. 2d 652; Whicher
vs. Delaware Mines Corp., 52 Idaho 304, 15 P. 2d 610, 616;
Alward vs. Broadway Gold Mining Company, 94 Mont. 45, 20 P. 2d
647; Adams vs. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179
P. 2d 147; Oregon, Rugger vs. Mt. Hood Elec. Co., 143 Ore. 193,
20 P. 2d 412; Duncan vs. Ponton (Tex. City App.), 102 S.W. 2d
517; Hein vs. Gravelle Farmers' Elevator Co., 164 Wash. 309,
2 P. 2d 741.
POINT II
THE TRANSACTIONS OF INTERESTED DIRECTORS ARE VOIDABLE
AT THE OPTION OF THE CORPORATION AND MAY BE SET ASIDE WITHOUT
SHOWING ACTUAL INJURY.
There is no question that all of the parties involved
knew that they were dealing with a corporation and with corporate property. (T. 348-349).

The majority rule, followed

by Utah as expressed in Branch vs. Western Factors, Inc., 28
Utah 2d 361, 502 P. 2d 570 (1972) is that a contract: "made by
the corporation with its officers are not void per se, but at
most voidable merely at the election of the corporation or its
representatives within a reasonable time."

It is also stated

in the Branch case that "a director occupies a fiduciary relationship to his corporation and his personal dealings with
the corporation may be avoided unless good faith and fairness
-11-

are shown".
This implies that the burden of showing good faith is
on the interested director.

Without the showing of good

faith the contract will be set aside.

In the case of Sweeney

vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P. 2d 126, a
transaction of a corporation with some of its directors was
examined.

The court agreed with the proposition that "when

a fiduciary deals for his own interest with the beneficiary,
in case any question arises such dealings should be scrutinized
with great care, and the burden is upon him to show good faith
in the transaction".

The cross-claimants failed to introduce

any tangible evidence concerning the true value of the property involved or to try and establish the fairness of the
transaction.

On cross examination concerning how the purchase

price of $250,000.00 was arrived at, Mrs. Housely stated that
"it was what we thought we had the possibility of getting a
loan on and it was worth offering to see if they would accept"
(T. 403-404).

Thus the primary concern of the interested

directors was on how much money they coiild borrow as individuals
and not necessarily what the true value of the trailer park was.
The case of Runswick vs. Floor, 116 Utah 91, 208 P. 2d
948 (1949) follows the majority position that "so long as corporate officers act fairly and in good iiaith, they are not
precluded from dealing or contracting with the corporation
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merely because they are its officers".

However, when this

situation exists the contract will be valid:
"Provided they act in good faith and provided
there is a quorum of directors on the other
side of the contract, so that the vote of the
interested director is not necessary to the
adoption of the measure; and even in the
latter case the contract is good in law."
In the situation before the court there was not a disinterested
quorum on the other side of the contract and thus there was no
contract.

Even if there had been a disinterested quorum on the

other side, the contract is voidable on a showing of lack of
fairness to the corporation.
As mentioned previously, since 1898 it has been the law
in Utah that if a director deals with his corporation in entire
good faith, fairness and honesty and the corporation is represented by other disinterested directors, then the transaction
is valid.

However, "where the corporation is represented in

the transaction by interested directors or officers who deal
with themselves the contract is voidable at the option of the
corporation merely because of the relationship without proof
of actual fraud or of actual injury to the corporation".
Jur. 2d Corporations Sec. 1291.

19 Am.

The law on this subject is

stated further in Section 1291 of Am. Jur. as follows:
"Similarly, it is said that if a director places
himself in a position in which he may be tempted
by his own private interests to disregard those
of the corporation, his transactions are voidable
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at the option of the corporation and may be
set aside without showing actual injury. It
is clear that contracts between a corporation
and its officers and directors are voidable for
unfairness and fraud. In any event, the burden
of proving the fairness of transactions between a corporation and its directors or officers
is upon the directors and officers seeking to
uphold its validity, and if they fail to do so,
either the transaction may be set aside, or the
corporation may affirm the transaction and hold
the director or officer liable for profits received by him or for losses sustained by the
corporation."
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING EXHIBITS D 9
AND D 10.
Before the cross-claimants could prevail on their claim
for specific performance the court was under an obligation to
examine closely the fairness of the transactions.

Defendants

offered Exhibits D 9 and D 10 to show the lack of fairness in
the transaction and the fair market value of the property involved as determined in an arms-length transaction.
Exhibit D 9 which was not admitted by the trial court
is an Earnest Money Agreement dated and signed March 15, 1974
by and between the two interested directors as sellers and
Hugh Wayman, an outsider, as purchaser.

The total purchase

price of $400,000.00 or $150,000.00 more than what the interested directors offered to purchase the same property for two
months earlier.

Max Engman, the banker, testified that the
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purchasers on the January 13, 191A Earnest Money Agreement
did not qualify for financing.

It was only after Hugh Wayman

came into the picture that financing was obtainable. (T. 382383).

The interested directors testified that even though

they were directors of the corporation, they did not intend
at this time to inform anyone else in the corporation of the
resale at $150,000.00 profit and in fact, no one else was
informed.
On April 9, 1974 the president of the corporation informed
the plaintiff realtor that the corporation would not consummate
the Earnest Money Agreement of January 13, 1974.

Plaintiff's

response was to submit another Earnest Money Agreement dated
April 11, 1974 from Hugh Wayman as purchaser directly to the
corporation for purchase of the same property for $400,000.00.
This document, Exhibit D 10, also not admitted by the trial
court, was offered to establish the fair market value of the
property involved as determined in an arms-length transaction.
In Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., cited previously, the question of determining the fair market value of land was involved.
The court held as follows:
"The rulings of the trial court reflect the
correct view that in order for evidence
concerning sales of other property to be
admissible as bearing on the market value
of the property in question, the test of
comparability of the sales must be met:
That the type of land, its location, its
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uses, actual and potential/ and the time and
circumstances of the sale are sufficiently
similar, that the price paid for the other
property can fairly and reasonably be regarded as having probative value as to the
worth of the property in question."
The documents offered and not accepted by the trial court meet
the criteria of the Sweeney case.

An examination of these two

documents show the unfairness of the offer of January 13, 1974.
There is no explanation for the increasfe in offering price by
$150,000.00 except that the higher offers are arms-length
transactions not controlled by interested directors.

Both

subsequent offers should have been examined by the court in
determining whether or not the interested directors contract
was fair to the corporation.
POINT IV
THE PROVISIONS OF §16-10-74, U.C.A., (1953) WERE NOT
COMPLIED WITH AND THE SALE OF THE CORPORATE ASSETS SHOULD
BE SET ASIDE.
Section 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated sets forth the procedure to be followed when a corporation sells all of its assets
other than in the regular course of business.

The first step

is for the board of directors to "adopt a resolution recommending such sale".

This recommendation of sale is then submitted

"to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may be either
an annual or a special meeting".

The central feature of this

statute is the right given to every shareholder to vote on
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whether or not he wants to sell the corporate assets..
The Utah Supreme Court has considered the application
of this statute in two prior cases.

Neither case deals with

the fact situation now before the court.

The first case was

Grover vs. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P. 2d 598 (1970).

This

was an action by a corporation to rescind a contract for the
sale of land nearly a year after the deed had been delivered.
Among other statements the Supreme Court stated that it was a
"sham corporation" in which virtually all of the stock was
owned by a husband and wife.

It was also pointed out that

the "sham corporation" had the assistance of counsel throughout
the entire negotiation and sales process.

A year after the

deed had been delivered and a substantial payment received, a
son who owned one share out of 100 shares issued, filed the
action on behalf of the corporation for recission under the
technicalities of §16-10-74.

The Supreme Court correctly ruled

that the corporation could not now hide behind the formality
of not having the sale approved by the stockholders.
The second case is similar to the first one.

In U-Beva

Mines vs. Toledo Mining Company, 24 Utah 2d 351, 471 P. 2d 867
(1970) U-Beva Mines attempted to void a lease with an option
to purchase when the defendant was late with an $87.00 tax
payment.

U-Beva set up the claim that its stockholders had

not approved the lease and option and on that basis it should
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be cancelled.

It was pointed out that the lease had been

in effect for some four years with substantial investment
having been made by the lessee.

The court stated "it would

hardly seem to lie in the corporations mouth to assert invalidity of the lease under the statute after having received
and kept monthly rentals for about four years".
Neither of these cases fit the fact situation now before
the court.

The only money which has changed hands is a $500.00

earnest money deposit which was refunded.
have been signed and no deeds delivered.

No final documents
The purchasers did

not go into possession nor make improvements on the property.
The corporation is not a sham corporation.

The time period

involved is a few months, not years as in the two cases mentioned.
Indeed, it would seem that this is the Very situation that
§16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated was designed for.

To hold other-

wise would deny protection of the law to the minority stockholders who were not directors and present when the offer of
January 13, 1974 was considered.
It is the general rule that this statute inures to the
benefit of the shareholder and is not assertable by the corporation.

When the corporation is taking a course of action

consistent with what the minority shareholder would take,
it would be an unnecessary act for a shareholder to assert
this statute himself, 58 ALR 2d 784 (1958).
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On the basis of

§16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated, the decision of the District
Court should be reversed and dismissed.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTEREST OF 6% PER
ANNUM ON PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEYS FEES FROM APRIL 10, 1974 UNTIL
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.
It is undisputed that plaintiff's agent contacted the
president of defendant corporation on April 9, 1974 to inform
her of the closing set for the next day.

It was on this occa-

sion that defendant's president informed plaintiff that the
corporation would not consummate the transaction.

Plaintiff

was awarded attorney's fees of $5,000.00 based on the listing
contract of November 13, 1973.
Defendants maintain that it was error to award any
attorney's fees in that there was no sale.

Defendants claim

that the error is compounded by awarding interest on the
attorney's fee from the date of the alleged breach of contract.
Plaintiff's counsel testified as to the amount of time involved but nothing was submitted as to when their services
commenced or why interest on the full amount of the attorney's
fees had been earned on the day of the alleged breach of
contract.

The award of attorney's fees to plaintiff's coun-

sel should be disallowed and particularly the award of interest on the attorney's fees should be disallowed.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, appellants respectfully request the court to
reverse the judgment of the trial couri.
Respectfully submitted,
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
C. Reed Brown
1300 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants
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